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The Death of OPEC? The Displacement of
Saudi Arabia as the World's Swing Producer
and the Futility of an Output Freeze
CHRISTOPHER HANEWALD*
ABSTRACT
On November 27, 2014, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries met in Vienna and adopted a bold stance against increasing
supply from beyond the reach of the cartel. Rather than reduce their own
production, the cartel decided to allow market forces to dictate the price
of a barrel of oil. By doing this, Saudi Arabia-the de-facto leader of the
cartel-made a bet that the burgeoning shale gas industry within the
United States would be unable to cope with a sharp fall in the price of
oil. Over the course of the following two years, the U.S. energy sector-
aided by further technological development-surprised Saudi Arabia
with its resiliency to withstand a low oil price environment. This note
explores how this tactic by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries was thwarted, why the oil industry is devoid of any global
oversight, and what this means for the future of the Oil Industry.
INTRODUCTION
Technological advancements in the last two decades have generated
more changes to business and industry than have been experienced
since the Industrial Revolution.' Rapid technological developments
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1. See Eugene Chernett, Note, What Would an Android Do?: Paving a Regulatory
Path to Technological Progress, 66 RUTGERS L.J. 179, 184 (2013) (citing RAY KURZWEIL,
THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR: WHEN HUMANS TRANSCEND BIOLOGY 10 (2005)) ("Technology
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throughout all aspects of the modern world have shuttered historic
industries, 2 created new sectors once thought to exist only in science
fiction,3 and caused others to evolve at the risk of obsolescence. 4 For the
majority of industries, these developments did not systemically affect
how they understood their industry; rather, the developments simply
altered the process in which products are manufactured and profits are
derived.
Amidst this change, the oil industry was believed by many to be
impervious to technological disruption.5 While there have been
numerous advances in how fossil fuels are consumed,6 the assumptions
about where those fuels were located and how they were extracted
remained seemingly immune from the pervasive disruptions occurring
throughout other industries. This unchanging narrative, however, has
recently been shaken to its core by a technology revolution that has
unfolded in less than a decade. This revolution, the United States Shale
Gas Revolution (Shale Revolution), is threatening-according to some-
the systemic understanding of an industry that was once believed to be
operating with a finite amount of product controlled by few.
In this Note, I explore the disruptive nature of the Shale Revolution
and how these recent developments have rendered the previous flimsy
advances at an exponential rate, a rate of progress that is inherently explosive and thus
'profoundly transformative."').
2. While certain industries, such as coal mining, are experiencing their death rattle as
environmental regulation and new technology make other energy sources far more viable
both fiscally and environmentally, other industries have only had certain segments of
their business displaced. See David Rotman, How Technology Is Destroying Jobs, MIT
TECH. REV. (June 12, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/515926/how-
technology-is-destroying-jobs/ ("Digital technologies tend to favor 'superstars,' they point
out. For example, someone who creates a computer program to automate tax preparation
might earn millions or billions of dollars while eliminating the need for countless
accountants.").
3. See id. ("McAfee, associate director of the MIT Center for Digital Business at the
Sloan School of Management, speaks rapidly and with a certain awe as he describes
advances such as Google's driverless car.").
4. See id. ("Modern automotive plants, many of which were transformed by industrial
robotics in the 1980s, routinely use machines that autonomously weld and paint body
parts-tasks that were once handled by humans.").
5. See Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
175, 182-83 (2014) ("In 1995, Joseph Bower and Clayton Christensen introduced the idea
of 'disruptive technologies' that depart fundamentally from existing ones, usually by being
less complicated, more accessible, and less expensive. Disruptive 'technologies'-later
broadened in the literature to disruptive 'innovations'-undermine and then displace
incumbents.").
6. See Sandy Manche, Maintaining the Highway Infrastructure as Alternative Fuel
Vehicle Usage Increases, 7 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES L. 515 (2015)
(exploring how an increased use of fuel efficient vehicles has led to a need for additional
funding to the Highway Trust Fund).
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and one-sided governing bodies of the industry meaningless. While
many have ventured to examine individual aspects of the Shale
Revolution,7 none have taken a broad perspective to observe how the
pieces affect the whole or why this industry was so susceptible to
disruption in the first place. By laying a firm historical basis, I hope to
first demonstrate that the absence of regulation within the industry was
a conscious decision made by the superpowers that emerged from World
War II. That decision, however, inadvertently made the establishment
of a cartel monopoly possible. Following the cartel's founding, a status
quo developed which firmly divided importers and exporters.
Organizations, scholarship, and assumptions were built upon the
presumption that the status quo would not change. For decades, this
system worked and maintained order-until one day it did not. This
Note will scrutinize the external and internal market forces exacting
such drastic change today and how previous understandings of the
industry are crumbling as the oil market proceeds into unknown
territory.
Part I will lay the historical foundation and examine the competing
interests that first led to the establishment of the status quo within the
oil industry. Part II will turn to an examination of the disruptive
technology that has irreversibly changed the once simple industry. I will
pay careful attention to cracks and fissures that have already developed
as a result of the Shale Revolution, why the previous governing bodies
are ill-equipped to handle the new world, and how there is a great
possibility for current conditions to worsen. Part III will turn to one
comprehensive international treaty, the Energy Charter Treaty, which
is the best solution to reconcile two outmoded governing bodies that
have recently been rendered meaningless. Finally, Part IV will make
the case that the Energy Charter Treaty, due to a number of factors,
some more intentional than others, has been positioned as the best
equipped body to carry this industry forward into the unknown.
I. BACKGROUND: FROM GATT TO OPEC AND EVERYTHING IN BETWEEN
7. See, e.g., S. Scott Gaille, How Can Governments Accelerate International Shale
Development?, 36 ENERGY L.J. 95 (2015) (describing the principal factors influencing the
pace of international shale projects); Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt,
Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947 (2015)
(explores the history and geography of oil and natural gas to help explain why U.S.
regulation of the infrastructure for transporting these two similar types of energy
resources to markets developed so differently); Ross H. Pifer, A Greener Shade of Blue:
Technology and the Shale Revolution, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 131
(2013) (discussing the continued development of the technology that began the Shale
Revolution, which was essential to fully realizing the benefits (and avoiding the adverse
effects) of energy resources).
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This section explores how the decision to exclude crude oil from any
type of international regulation laid the groundwork for the current
dysfunctional market. Oil, arguably the most important resource after
World War II, was deliberately omitted from early trade negotiations,
and that choice by the world superpowers, who at that time controlled
Middle Eastern proven reserves, 8 has had profound effects throughout
the commodity's history. By first examining the motivation for
international exclusion following WWII, and then turning to the lead up
to and founding of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), I will lay a historical foundation that will be useful when
examining contemporary issues facing the industry. This early rejection
of regulation led to the later development of a bifurcated system in
which a firm line developed between importers and exporters.
Following the conclusion of WWII, the world entered a new age of
connectedness. In December of 1945, just five months after the
Japanese surrendered in the Pacific, fifteen countries came together
with a goal to reduce and bind tariffs.9 These original countries
recognized the new era that technology had ushered in and hoped to
"give an early boost to trade liberalization, and to begin to correct the
legacy of protectionist measures which remained in place from the early
1930s."1o
These negotiations eventually resulted in numerous trade rules and
over forty-five thousand tariff concessions that affected more than $10
billion in global trade." When this agreement was finally signed on
October 30, 1947, the signatories had expanded to twenty-three
countries. 12 On June 30, 1948, the tariff concessions became effective
and with that, the first General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) brought about a new era of global economic cooperation.' 3
The original signatories of the 1948 GATT intended to create an
International Trade Organization (ITO), however, later negotiations
8. See Petroleum Reserves Definitions, Soc'Y OF PETROLEUM ENG'RS,
http/www.spe.org/industry/petroleum-reserves-definitions.php (Mar. 1997) ("Proved reserves
are those quantities of petroleum which, by analysis of geological and engineering data,
can be estimated with reasonable certainty to be commercially recoverable; from a given
date forward, from known reservoirs and under current economic conditions, operating
methods, and government regulations.").
9. See The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh, WTO, httpsJ/www.wto.org/engish
/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/fact4 e.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2016).
10. Id. See also John H. Jackson, The WTO 'Constitution' and Proposed Reforms: Seven
'Mantras'Revisited, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 67, 68 (2001) (identifying a primary objective of the
GATT founders in the aftermath of World War II as avoiding another war by reducing the
economic conditions that were seen as evocative of conflict).
11. See The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh, supra note 9.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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were ultimately for naught. 14 Their efforts to ratify the ITO proved to be
an impossible task for the negotiating countries and therefore "the
GATT became the only multilateral instrument governing international
trade from 1948 until the WTO was established in 1995."15 While
successive GATT agreements continued to prevail in the interim, the
Uruguay Round of 1986 eventually led to the creation of the World
Trade Organization (WTO), nearly a half century after the failure of the
ITO.16 Contained within this momentous agreement were provisions
covering "almost all trade, from toothbrushes to pleasure boats, from
banking to telecommunications, from the genes of wild rice to AIDS
treatments."17
Global economics were undeniably changed in 1948 with GATT and
further strengthened with the eventual creation of the nearly all-
encompassing WTO. There is, however, one element of the global
economy that was either ignored or strategically excluded throughout
this long history of negotiations-crude oil.
World War II brought to light another important revelation: the
foreseeable future of economic development was inextricably linked to
the control and steady supply of fossil fuels. 18 The new world
superpowers emerged from WWII understanding that oil had become,
arguably, the most important resource. The United States, United
Kingdom, Belgium, and France, all signatories of the original GATT,19
recognized the strategic importance and proceeded to establish control
over the proven reserves of oil.20
By the time GATT negotiations had begun "[m]ost of the oil fields
were under the control of the American, British, Dutch, or French
multilateral enterprises." 21 Therefore, as GATT negotiations continued,
"these countries would have liked to avoid tensions over the control of
resources, they seemed to implicitly exclude the most strategic
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See The Uruguay Round, WTO, https/www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis_eltif e/
fact5_e.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2016).
17. Id.
18. Wen-chen Shih, Energy Security, GATT/ WTO, and Regional Agreements, 49 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 433, 436 (2009) ("For most of the industrialized countries, one crucial aspect
of energy security is the supply of oil and natural gas at reasonable prices.").
19. See The 128 Countries That Had Signed GATT by 1994, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/gattmem-e.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2016).
20. See Susan L. Sakmar, Bringing Energy Trade into the WTO: The Historical
Context, Current Status, and Potential Implications for the Middle East Region, 18 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 89, 90 (2008) ("Due to the strategic importance of petroleum and the
initial non-participation of most key energy exporters in the early GATT rounds, energy
products have largely been exempted from multilateral trading rules.").
21. Shih, supra note 18, at 439.
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international commodity-crude oil-from the GATT negotiations." 22
Support for the argument that this exclusion was deliberate is
strengthened by the fact that none of the oil-exporting countries were
Contracting Parties to the GATT.23
Early control by world superpowers quickly waned due to a rash of
expropriations and, in one decisive move, which was certainly not
anticipated by the signatories of the 1948 GATT, OPEC was formed on
September 14, 1960. 24The system that developed following OPEC's
creation was one in which cooperation was dis-incentivized from the
OPEC members' perspective. 25 Following decades of colonial control,
proceeded by effective control via multinational corporations, 26 OPEC
members found themselves, for the first time ever, in control of the
future of their countries. Expropriations grew more frequent and in July
1971, OPEC "announced that it would take 'immediate steps toward the
effective implementation of the principle of Participation.' 27 Member
countries wanted control of their country's resources, and although
foreign oil companies initially fought this push, they ultimately lost the
battle. "[B]y 1972 the OPEC member nations were granted control over
major oil company operations, either immediately or else on a strict
timetable for gradual government owernship [sic]."28
In October 1973, on the back of successful and relatively
unchallenged expropriations, OPEC brought the oil-dependent, non-
OPEC countries to their knees. 29 OPEC flexed its new and full power
when the members imposed an "embargo on petroleum exports to
several countries, including the United States."30 By the time the
22. Id.
23. Id. Additionally, scholar Wen-chen Shih goes so far as to insinuate the strategic
aspect of the exclusion. Id. ("A 'gentlemen's agreement,' perhaps, was in place in the
GATT's early history to continue excluding issues relating to trade and price of crude oil
from the GATT framework.").
24. James K. Hickel, Note: The Role of Expropriation in the Formation of the OPEC
Cartel, 2 ENERGY L.J. 107, 108 (1981).
25. See Tim Carey, Comment, Cartel Price Controls vs. Free Trade: A Study of
Proposals to Challenge OPEC's Influence in the Oil Market Through WTO Dispute
Settlement, 24 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 783, 788 (2009) ("At its inception, the goal of OPEC's
founding members was to protect the collective bargaining power of oil producing nations
from protectionism and the coordinated operations of the world's largest oil
corporations.").
26. See Hickel, supra note 24, at 108 n.7 ("In 1960, the five major oil-producing
countries-Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela-received a total of more
than two billion dollars in oil revenues.").
27. Id. at 110 (quoting Org. Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC], Res. XXIV-135,
OPEC Twenty-Fourth Conference (July 13, 1971)).
28. Hickel, supra note 24, at 110.
29. See id. at 107, 110.
30. Id. at 107.
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embargo was lifted in April 1974, both OPEC and non-OPEC countries
alike recognized that control and access to a stable flow of oil had
become the single most important resource on which the entire global
economy was built.
In reaction to the embargo and in an attempt to regain some
semblance of control, the International Energy Agency (IEA) was
founded in 1974.31 The IEA was formed "to help countries co-ordinate a
collective response to major disruptions in the supply of oil."32 While
idealistically viable, the IEA suffers from a severe lack of bargaining
power. The IEA is comprised of twenty-nine member countries that
must demonstrate they are
a net oil importer, [with] reserves of crude oil andlor
product equivalent to 90 days of the prior year's average
net oil imports to which the government (even if it does
not own those stocks directly) has immediate access
should the Co-ordinated Emergency Response Measures
(CERM) - which provide a rapid and flexible system of
response to actual or imminent oil supply disruptions -
be activated. 33
While the strategic reserve system established through the IEA, in
theory, protects member countries from immediate disruptions, 34 the
group itself still concedes "the IEA follows short- and medium-term
developments on the international oil market." 35
The inherently defensive nature of the IEA was clear from its
founding and built solely to protect member countries from a repeat of
the 1973 oil shock. While the group today wishfully places itself at "the
heart of global dialogue on energy, providing authoritative statistics and
31. See About, IEA, https://www.iea.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2016).
32. Id.
33. See Member Countries, IEA, http://www.iea.org/countries/membercountries/ (last
visited Nov. 16, 2016).
34. See Petroleum Reserves, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY: OFF. OF FOSSIL ENERGY,
http://energy.gov/fe/services/petroleum-reserves (last visited Nov. 18, 2016) ("Established
in the aftermath of the 1973-74 oil embargo, the SPR provides the President with a
powerful response option should a disruption in commercial oil supplies threaten the U.S.
economy. It is also the critical component for the United States to meet its International
Energy Agency obligation to maintain emergency oil stocks, and provides a national
defense fuel reserve.").
35. See Oil, IEA, http://www.iea.org/topics/oill (last visited Nov. 16, 2016).
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analysis,"3 6 it is undeniable that the TEA is effectively without any true
multilateral power, other than as a trusted statistician. 37
With the dividing lines drawn clearly between importers and
exporters, the market, since September 14, 1960, has been left to
develop in response to the dictates of OPEC. Organizations such as the
TEA can attempt to mitigate damage and, additionally or separately,
regional trade agreements (RTAs)38 can be signed in the hopes of
ensuring stability on an individual country level. It is, however,
indisputable that trade in the single most important commodity has
been effectively unregulated since the realization of its supreme
importance following World War II. Clearly, the superpowers never
envisioned the possibility of an OPEC-like regime, or else one would
imagine that the regulation of oil would have been the subject of a
majority of the debate in the lead-up to the 1948 GATT. Furthermore,
since oil-exporting countries banded together to form the most powerful
cartel on the planet, there has never once been an incentive for these
formerly dominated colonies to consider the fairness of the policies
governing their monopoly-until now.
II. TECHNOLOGICAL BREAKTHROUGHS LEADING THE OIL MARKET INTO
UNPRECEDENTED TERRITORY
In this section, recent technological developments within oil
exploration and production, which have effectively turned all previous
scholarship regarding the industry on its head, will be carefully
examined. Up until the mid-2000s, the oil industry was believed to be
generally understood and subject to little surprise. 39 OPEC dictated
36. About, supra note 31.
37. See Oil, supra note 35 ("The IEA prepares current oil market assessments from
information submitted by IEA member and non-member countries, international oil
companies and via an extensive network of market intelligence contacts. Issues covered
include: oil exploration and production, oil demand by main product and sector, upstream
and downstream investment levels, geopolitical developments, inventory levels, oil
refining and international trade in crude and products.").
38. See Rafael Leal-Arcas et al., Multilateral, Regional and Bilateral Energy Trade
Governance, 6 RENEWABLE ENERGY L. & POLY REV. 38, 49-50 (2015) ("RTAs currently
represent a major, and perhaps irreversible, characteristic of the multilateral trading
system. Since the mid-1990s, there has been a virtual explosion in the number of economic
integration agreements (EIAs) concluded. According to the World Trade Organization web
site, as of 15 June 2014, some 585 notifications of RTAs (counting goods, services and
accessions separately)-379 of which are in force-had been received.").
39. This general understanding, however, was focused on a pessimistic view of
diminishing resources. See John E. Rhea, Privatization in the International Petroleum
Industry: The Interplay Between Politics, Economics, and Reliance, 33 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POLY 609 (2005) ("In the very near future the world will experience an energy crisis and a
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prices and controlled supply in response to lulls in demand-also known
as a cyclical correction. 40 This understanding in addition to previous
assumptions regarding peak oil,41 viability of shale oil, and OPEC's
future in the world of oil production have all been called into question
within the last decade.
A. Current Market Issues
The Shale Revolution in the United States has profoundly and
irreversibly altered the global energy landscape. 42 Beginning in earnest
in 2006,43 independent U.S. oil companies began utilizing a new
technology called hydraulic fracturing (fracking). The process of
fracking involves the pumping of a mixture of water and sand down
previously drilled and cased wells.44 The pressure at which the mixture
is pumped into the well, coupled with the mixture's ability to open up-
or fracture-small crevices already existing in the impervious rock
layers some six to ten thousand feet below the surface, allows previously
untapped oil reserves to flow freely enough to be pumped from the
ground.45
shock to economic systems much like that experienced in the 1970s and mid-1980s. Only
this time, the end of production will not be the result of any unilateral exercise of
sovereign power. Instead, the crisis will result from an actual worldwide depletion of fossil
fuel resources.").
40. See David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, The Transformation of American Energy
Markets and the Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L. REV. 131, 171 (2012) ("The 2008 fall
in oil prices also corresponded with an economic downturn, further supporting the
connection between demand for the physical product and its price.").
41. For a definition of "peak oil," see N.E. "Skip" Maryan, Peak Oil: The End of The
Roller Coaster Ride? Implications for Law and Policy, 52 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1-1, §
1.03 (2006) ('The term 'Peak Oil' can be defined as the point at which half the total world
oil supply known to exist has been consumed."); Edna Sussman, A Multilateral Energy
Sector Investment Treaty: Is It Time for a Call for Adoption by All Nations?, 44 INT'L LAW.
939, 947 (2010) ("Numerous reports and vigorous debates about 'peak oil,' i.e. when oil
production reaches a peak leaving only diminishing stocks for the future, have been
issued.").
42. See Christopher Goncalves, Breaking Rules and Changing the Game: Will Shale
Gas Rock the World?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 225, 227 (2014) ("The evolving results of this
disruptive activity could be revolutionary in the United States and worldwide. It positions
the United States to transform itself from a net importer to a net exporter of natural gas
by the end of this decade, with oil perhaps soon to follow, and it threatens to
fundamentally alter global LNG commercial and pricing practices.").
43. See id. at 232 (citing IVAN SANDREA, US SHALE GAS AND TIGHT OIL INDUSTRY
PERFORMANCE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 2 (2014)).
44. See Hydraulic Fracturing: The Process, FRACFOcuS (July 20, 2010), https://fracfocus
.org/hydraulic-fracturing-how-it-works/hydraulic-fracturing-process.
45. See id.
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Regardless of one's personal belief concerning the process of
fracking, 46 the utilization of this process has led to the "US ... currently
experiencing a transition period in which it could, after decades of being
a major energy importer, evolve into a major energy exporter due to the
unprecedented surge of US domestic energy production." 47 Frankly,
even a decade ago, a claim like this would have assuredly received
prompt dismissal from even the foremost scholars within the industry.
Today, however, scholars no longer need to hypothesize and can state
with authority that "[t]he combination of horizontal drilling and
hydraulic fracturing (fracking) has transformed the United States from
a net importer of natural gas to a country that is set to become a net
exporter by 2015."48 While the domestic production of oil has grown at a
rapid pace, 49 Tincher's quote actually refers to liquefied natural gas
(LNG), which has experienced such exponential growth that "[p]rojects
originally intended as natural gas import pipelines are now being
proposed as liquefied natural gas (LNG) export pipelines."5 0 Beginning
in 2013 and continuing through most of 2014, these developments were
lauded by Wall Street and Washington alike.5 1
46. Hydraulic fracturing is an extremely divisive issue. However, this debate is beyond
the purview of this note. It should be noted, though, that many previous claims about
environmental impacts on the water table have been debunked and one must endeavor to
fully research this topic before blindly believing claims made by either side on this debate.
See Seamus McGraw, Is Fracking Safe? The 10 Most Controversial Claims About Natural
Gas Drilling, POPULAR MECHANICs, (May 1, 2016), httpJ/www.popularmechanics.com/science/
energy/gl6ltop-10-myths-about-natural-gas-drilling-6386593/ ("But the idea stressed by
fracking critics that deep-injected fluids will migrate into groundwater is mostly false.
Basic geology prevents such contamination from starting below ground. A fracture caused
by the drilling process would have to extend through the several thousand feet of rock that
separate deep shale gas deposits from freshwater aquifers.").
47. Leal-Arcas et al., supra note 38, at 76.
48. Gina Tincher, The Unconventional Gas Technical Engagement Program: How to
Ensure the United States Shares Its Experience in a Socially and Environmentally
Responsible Manner, 36 ENERGY L.J. 113, 114 (2015).
49. See Today in Energy, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 30, 2015),
http1/www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detaiLcfn?id=20572 ("U.S. crude oil production (including
lease condensate) increased during 2014 by 1.2 million barrels per day (bbl/d) to 8.7
million bbl/d, the largest volume increase since recordkeeping began in 1900. On a
percentage basis, output in 2014 increased by 16.2%, the highest growth rate since 1940.
Most of the increase during 2014 came from tight oil plays in North Dakota, Texas, and
New Mexico where hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling were used to produce oil
from shale formations.").
50. Tincher, supra note 48 at 114. See also John Hurdle, Gas Industry Urges U.S. to
Speed Approval of LNG Export Terminals, STATEIMPACT (Apr. 16, 2015), https://stateimpact
.npr.org/pennsylvania/2015/0416/gas-industry-urges-u-s-to-speed-approval-of-Ing-export-terminals/.
51. See Matthew Rocco, U.S. Shale Profits Beating Big Oil Rivals, Fox BUSINESS (Oct.
27, 2015), http://www.foxbusiness.com/industries/2015/10/27/us-shale-oil-firms-dominate-
platts-rankings/ ("The Platts Top 250 Global Energy Company Rankings, which measured
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The self-congratulatory American cheers were stifled, however,
when OPEC producers met on November 27, 2014 and made a bold
statement in the face of American ingenuity.52 OPEC's secretary
general, supported by all member countries, announced that OPEC
would not support 2014 record oil prices by reducing production and
ceding market share to the burgeoning U.S. producers; instead, it opted
to see "how the market behaves, because the decline of the price does
not reflect a fundamental change."53 Following the announcement,
benchmark Brent crude oil prices dropped from summer 2014 highs of
over $110 a barrel to $69.05 following the announcement. 54 The thirty
percent price decline in the months leading up to the November meeting
was due to "sluggish global demand and rising production from the
U.S."66
In the two years since OPEC members shocked both the world and
oil market, prices have fluctuated wildly from $28 to $60 a barrel.56
Ultimately, the decision by OPEC to refuse to prop up oil prices by
cutting production was strategic in nature. At the time of the November
announcement, costs associated with fracking led to a breakeven point
for U.S. producers that were substantially higher than the price it costs
for OPEC members to produce the same barrel of oil.5 7 Therefore, the
strategy was quite simple. Keep OPEC member production steady at
2014 financial performance in a variety of sectors, showed that it was a strong year for
U.S. shale players, whose earnings growth outpaced industry heavyweights."); Daniel
Yergin, Congratulations, America. You're (Almost) Energy Independent., POLITICO MAG.
(Nov. 2013), http/ww.poltico.com/magazine/story/2)1311/ungratulatins-america-youre-amnost-
energy-independent-now-what-098985 (citing President Barack Obama in a 2012 presidential
debate) ("On energy, Governor Romney and I, we both agree that we've got to boost
American energy production, and oil and natural gas production are higher than they've
been in years.").
52. See Oil Prices Plunge After OPEC Meeting, BBC NEWS (Nov. 28, 2014), http://www.
bbc.com/news/business-30223721.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. See Crude Oil Prices-70 Year Historical Chart, MACROTRENDS, http://www.macro
trends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart (last visited Nov. 17, 2016).
57. At the time of the November 27, 2014 announcement, the general breakeven point
for U.S. shale producers was believed to be in the range of $80 a barrel, highly dependent
on the location of the shale formation. See Mark J. Perry, Saudis' Drive to Kill US Shale
Has Backfired, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (May 26, 2015), https://www.aei.org/publication/
saudis-drive-to-kill-us-shale-has-backfired/. In stark contrast, it costs Saudi Arabia only
about $2 to produce a barrel of oil. Production costs vary among OPEC members, however,
they are all well below Shale production costs. See Tim Mullaney, Opinion: OPEC Is
Wrong to Think It Can Outlast U.S. on Oil Prices, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 2, 2014, 5:01 AM),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/opec-is-wrong-to-think-it-can-outlast-us-on-oil-prices-
2014-12-02.
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thirty million barrels per day, allow the global supply glut to worsen
enabling a free fall in the price of oil, and watch as American producers
either defaulted under massive debt loads or were forced into
bankruptcy due to low prices and heavily leveraged assets. 5 8
B. Potential for Worsening of Market Conditions
At the outset, OPEC's strategy appeared simple, straightforward,
and bound for success; however, recent developments within the last
two years have led to questions concerning the long-term feasibility of
this plan. Drastic strides in U.S. shale technology have led to
substantial gains in efficiency. The historic implementation of the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran, beginning on October 18, 2015,
has resulted in the lifting of international sanctions and allowed Iran to
rejoin the oil production market.59 Additionally, lost revenue from the
drop in oil prices appears to be taking its toll within OPEC, as many
members have begun voicing concerns regarding unbalanced budgets
and domestic social strife.60
While falling oil prices have assuredly taken their toll on domestic
oil companies,6 1 the complete collapse and wave of bankruptcies that
OPEC's plan hinged upon has yet to occur. 62 There are multiple reasons
for this resilience on behalf of U.S. oil producers. First, banks and
noteholders that allowed U.S. producers to borrow billions in the "gold-
58. See Oil Prices Plunge After OPEC Meeting, supra note 52. See also Wayne Duggan,
The U.S. Shale Producers Operating with Unsustainable Debt, YAHOO FINANcE (Sept. 18,
2015), http://fnance.yahoo.com/news/u-shale-producers-operating-unsustainable-160122638.htmL
59. See Felicia Schwartz & Jay Solomon, Iran Nuclear Deal Formally Adopted, WALL
STREET J. (Oct. 19, 2015, 9:26 AM), http//www.wsj.om/articles/iran-nuclear-deal-formally-
adopted-1445195172.
60. See Kenneth Rapoza, Venezuela on the Brink, Large Protest Seeks to Pressure
President to Resign, FORBES (Aug. 19, 2016, 12:57 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
kenrapoza/2016/08/19/venezuela-on-the-brink-large-protest-seeks-to-pressure-president-
to-resign/#172c2e59f4cl.
61. See Kira Brecht, Oil Stocks May Have Hit Bottom: Here's What to Expect Next, U.S.
NEWS, (July 21, 2015, 9:09 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/mutual
-funds/articles/2015/07/21/oil-stocks-may-have-hit-bottom-heres-what-to-expect-next.
62. While there have been a number of bankruptcies and defaults, so far, only the
weakest and least prepared have suffered. See Matt Krantz, Corporate Default Rate
Expected to Jump 30%, USA TODAY (Aug. 21, 2016, 4:54 PM), http://www.usatoday.com
/story/money/markets/2016/08/19/corporate-default-rate-expected-jump-30-soon/88967964/
("Stocks in the energy and natural resources industries have accounted for 57% of defaults
the past 12 months, S&P says."); Asjylyn Loder et al., Oil Crash Risks $19 Billion Wave of
Junk Debt Defaults, BLOOMBERG (March 11, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2016-03-1 1/oil-boom-fueled-by-junk-debt-faces-19-billion-wave-of-defaults
(last visited Nov. 17, 2016) ("Since the start of 2015, 48 oil and gas producers have gone
bankrupt owing more than $17 billion, according to law firm Haynes and Boone.").
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rush" between 2008 and 2014 are heavily incentivized to renegotiate
credit lines with producers, 63 as outright declaration of bankruptcy
could significantly harm banks and the economy writ large due to the
sheer amount of money leveraged within the industry. 64 While banks
have renegotiated credit lines and cut the ability of small producers to
borrow more money and forestall bankruptcy, the issue remains that
loans are secured on the proven reserves of these companies and "oil
wells operated by an insolvent producer could also keep pumping if
they're acquired by another company, or taken over by creditors in a
bankruptcy."65
Second, the technology that first allowed U.S. producers to access
shale oil has exponentially improved within the last two years. Forcibly
stimulated by OPEC's strategy, U.S. producers "have brought down
costs by securing price cuts from service providers and pioneering more
efficient recovery methods."66 Once thought to not be feasible below $80
a barrel, producers in some areas of the country, most notably North
Dakota's prolific Bakken formation, have managed to lower breakeven
costs into the $20 range.6 7 In Texas's Eagle Ford formation, drillers
have managed to cut the time it takes to drill a well down to just
seventeen days resulting in a reduction in "the cost of drilling wells from
$4.5 million to $3.5 million."68 These gains in efficiency have led
Goldman Sachs to predict that prices will remain around $50 a barrel
for the next five years as "[s]hale efficiency and innovation have created
a new ceiling for the price of oil."69
While initially it may have appeared that OPEC's strategy was
succeeding for a time, as evidenced by the IEA's consistent
announcements of declining U.S. oil rig count, 70 the narrative has
63. See Chesapeake Energy Corporation Announces Arrangement of $1.0 Billion Term
Loan Facility, PR NEWSWIRE (Aug. 15, 2016, 6:00 PM), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/chesapeake-energy-corporation-announces-arrangement-of-10-billion-term-loan-
facility-300313211.html.
64. See Daniel Gilbert et. al, Oil Patch Braces for Financial Reckoning, WALL STREET J.
(Sept. 16, 2015, 11:28 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/oil-patch-braces-for-financial-
reckoning-1442274651.
65. Id.
66. Tom DiChristopher, US Crude Oil's Break-Even Cost: How Low Can It Go?, CNBC,
(Aug. 20, 2015, 3:54 PM) http://www.cnbe.com/2015/08/20/us-crude-oils-break-even-cost-
how-low-can-it-go.html.
67. See id.
68. Additionally, the reduction in the amount of time it takes to bring a well on-line
might mean that even if the Saudi strategy succeeds in the near term, American Shale
producers will simply rejoin the market when prices climb back to profitable levels. See
Perry, supra note 57.
69. Id.
70. See OPEC, MONTHLY OIL MARKET REPORT, 12 OCTOBER 2015 3 (2015).
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recently reversed. In May 2016, the oil market had staged a modest
recovery in price due to unanticipated supply outages, 7 ' decreasing non-
OPEC supply,72 and the ever-present possibility of an OPEC supply
output freeze. 73 While optimism of a wide-scale price recovery
momentarily flourished, it was almost immediately stifled as a direct
result of the efficiency gains already discussed. 74 This ebb and flow-
fleeting optimism followed by crushing increases in U.S. rig count and
OPEC supply-has dominated the summer of 2016 and there appears to
be no end in sight.75 Whenever prices incrementally recover and
approach the $50 threshold, U.S. shale producers can simply return to
previously drilled and idled wells to turn the proverbial faucet back
on,76 thus immediately jeopardizing any semblance of a price recovery.
Additionally, Iran's recent agreement with the United States and
other negotiating countries to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
on October 18, 2015 has resulted in the lifting of sanctions levied
against Iran that have been in place for years.77 The removal of
sanctions has led to Iran aggressively ramping up production as Oil
71. See Georgi Kantchev & Nicole Friedman, Oil Prices Rise, Supply Outages in Focus,
WALL STREET J. (May 10, 2016, 5:10 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/oil-prices-rise-
supply-outages-in-focus- 1462871742.
72. Katy Barnato, Oil Will Soon Stage a 'Fundamental Price Recovery' Analyst, CNBC
(May 23, 2016, 8:36 AM), http://www.cnbe.com/2016/05/23toil-will-soon-stage-a-fundamental-
price-recovery-analysthtml ("The U.S. rotary rig count last week was down two at 404, Baker
Hughes reported. That was 481 rigs down on last year and the lowest since Baker Hughes
started counting rigs in 1949.").
73. Benoit Faucon et al., OPEC Officials: May Discuss Oil Freeze at June Meeting,
WALL STREET J. (Apr. 21, 2016, 1:57 PM), httpI/www.wsj.com/articlestopec-secretary-general-says-
cartel-may-discuss-oil-fieeze-at-june-meeting-1461234875 ("A production freeze was an idea that
had helped send prices rallying more than 50% from 12-year lows last winter.").
74. See Devika Krishna Kumar, Oil Slides as U.S. Rig Count Rises, Economy Concerns,
REUTERS (June 3, 2016), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/brent-crude-oil-stabilizes-around-
011309919.html ("'The increase in the rig count as prices near the $50/bbl range is clearly
indicative of the elasticity of U.S. production and speaks to the tremendous efficiency
gains reaped by the U.S. producer community over recent years,' said Michael Tran,
director of energy strategy at RBC Capital Markets in New York.").
75. See Christopher Johnson, Update 4: Oil Prices Fall as Hopes of Production Freeze
Fade, CNBC (Aug. 25, 2016, 6:46 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/25/reuters-america-
update-4-oil-prices-fall-as-hopes-of-production-freeze-fade.html.
76. Oil Settles Down 3.03% at $47.05, Breaking Seven-Day Winning Streak, CNBC
(Aug. 22, 2016, 2:37 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/21/oil-prices-fall-as-analysts-say-
august-price-rally-has-been-overblown.html ("Adding to the bearish sentiment, U.S.
drillers added 10 oil rigs in the week to Aug. 19 as crude rebounded towards the key $50
mark that makes a return to the well pad viable. . .. [T]he 32 rigs added in August alone
would add close to 200,000 bpd of extra supply through 2017.").
77. David E. Sanger, Iran Complies With Nuclear Deal; Sanctions Are Lifted, NEW
YORK TIMES (Jan. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/17/world/middleeast/iran-
sanctions-lifted-nuclear-deal.html?r=0.
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Minister Bijan Namadar Zanganeh hopes to "reach a figure between 3.8
and 3.9 million barrels a day."7 8 Furthermore, due to current market
conditions and Iran's desperate need to raise revenue after years of
devastating sanctions, there currently exists a stalemate between the
two most important members of OPEC: Saudi Arabia and Iran.7 9 Iran
has adamantly expressed an unwillingness to negotiate with OPEC
until it can attain pre-sanction oil production levels.8 0
Furthermore, recent internal squabbling within OPEC is not unique
to Iran's return to the global market. Other members, especially those
less fiscally prepared, such as Venezuela and Nigeria, have expressed
significant concern regarding the oil price rout.81 The historically united
front is beginning to show weaknesses as members have begun fighting
for market share within OPEC as "the semblance of unity has vanished
when setting monthly selling prices."82 The most obvious reason for the
heightening of tensions within the group is the growing concern over
what the price collapse has done to member country's budgets. While
OPEC members can produce a barrel of oil at a fraction of the cost of
U.S. producers,8 3 the member countries' budgets are so oil revenue-
centric that questions have begun to arise about whether members can
survive the current price environment.
Saudi Arabia, the quasi leader and member with the largest
reserves, 84 is "expected to post a budget deficit of almost twenty percent
of gross domestic product this year, according to the International
Monetary Fund."85 This significant decline in oil revenue could have far-
reaching political implications for member countries as they balance
budgets by cutting social programs typically funded by the wealth
78. Matthew Phillips & Golnar Motevalli, Iran Gets Ready to Sell to the World,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 10, 2015, 2:24 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2015-09-10/iran-gets-ready-to-sell-oil-to-the-world.
79. See John Kemp, Saudi Arabia Turns Oil Weapon on Iran: Kemp, REUTERS (Apr. 18,
2016, 9:01 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-meeting-kemp-idUSKCNOXF2AR
("Saudi Arabia will not accept any constraints on its output, even freezing at record levels,
unless Iran agrees to similar controls, which it has rejected until production has reached
pre-sanctions levels.").
80. See Iran Aims to Boost Oil Exports Without OPEC's Blessing-Minister, RT, (Nov.
18, 2015, 11:58 AM), https://www.rt.com/business/322538-iran-oil-opec-sanctions/.
81. See Serene Cheong, OPEC Brings Oil Price War Home in Pursuit of Asia's Cash,
BLOOMBERG, (Oct. 19, 2015, 12:43 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-
19/opec-brings-oil-price-war-home-in-pursuit-of-asia-s-cash.
82. Id.
83. See Mullaney, supra note 57.
84. See OPEC: The Cartel is Standing Pat on Production, for Now, WALL STREET J.,
http://graphics.wsj.com/lists/opec-meeting (last visited Nov. 16, 2016).
85. Cheong, supra note 81.
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produced from oil rents.86 While some countries are better positioned to
withstand the downturn- such as United Arab Emirates, which only
requires an oil price of $77.30 a barrel in order to balance their 2015
fiscal budget- other countries like Algeria, Venezuela, Nigeria, and
Libya all require well over an impossible threshold of $120 a barrel or
more just to balance their budgets.87
C. Antiquated Organizations
Considering the number of topics covered thus far, one cannot help
but question whether OPEC and the IEA represent vestiges of the past
bound for relegation to the periphery of history. In addition to the
concerns already covered, recent announcements have cut to the very
core purpose of both organizations.
It appears that the Shale Revolution within the United States has
begun to threaten the core purpose of the IEA. The United States in
2011 "exported more gasoline, diesel and other fuels than it imported for
the first time since 1949."88 While 2011 certainly marked a great
achievement for United States refineries, the greater victory came when
growing domestic oil production actually surpassed imports in 2014.89
With this development, the United States is actually at risk of-by
definition-exiting the IEA as it no longer meets membership
requirements of being a net-oil importer.90
Moreover, a recent momentous event occurred on December 18,
2015 when "Congress voted to put an end to the problem [of oil market
distortions between Brent Crude and West Texas Intermediate Crude]
86. The current government of Venezuela and the country as a whole may be the first
casualty of OPEC's price war. See Venezuela Scrambles to Head Off Collapse, Yahoo!
Finance (May 16, 2016), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/venezeula-scrambles-head-off-
collapse-184401832.html ('The IMF predicts inflation will top 700 percent this year before
surging to some 2,200 percent next year."); Tom DiChristopher & John W. Schoen, OPEC
States that Wanted Production Cuts Buckle Under the New Oil Order, CNBC (June 1,
2016, 10:41 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/06/01/opec-states-that-wanted-production-
cuts-buckle-under-the-new-oil-order.html?_source=newsletter%7Ceveningbrief ("Street
protesters are calling for President Nicolas Maduro to step down, leading to confrontations
with police. Maduro's party does not hold a majority in the Venezuelan legislature, and
friction between the two branches of government has led to a constitutional crisis.").
87. OPEC: The Cartel is Standing Pat on Production, for Now, supra note 84.
88. Barbara Powell, U.S. Was Net Oil-Product Exporter for First Time Since 1949,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 29, 2012, 2:52 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-02-
29/u-s-was-net-oil-product-exporter-in-201 1.
89. Daniel Wood, US Oil Production and Imports, U.S. Dept. of Energy,
http//wwwenergy.gov/maps/is-crude-oil-production-surpasses-net-imports (last visited Nov. 16,
2016).
90. See Member Countries, supra note 33.
292
THE DEATH OF OPEC
by lifting the 40-year-old [oil] export ban as part of an omnibus budget
bill."91 While the immediate effect of this change in domestic policy will
be subdued due to the current persistent low price environment, the
medium- to long-term effects could be substantial. 92 Whenever a
significant price recovery does occur, the political and economic
implications could be profound as many expect "US crude oil exports to
compete in Asia with the Middle East, Russia and Africa," 93 as the U.S.
shifts to a position as a predominate exporter. 94
An additional acknowledgement of the archaic nature of lEA
strategy appeared within the same budget negotiations that yielded the
lifting of the domestic export ban. Contained within the Bipartisan
Budget Act of 2015 was an agreement to sell fifty-eight million barrels
of oil from the strategic reserve.95 This announcement has spurred an
interesting debate among economists regarding whether the strategic
reserve still serves it's once useful purpose.9 6
While the lEA is subject to nagging questions from within regarding
its usefulness in the current world, OPEC's purpose is rapidly eroding
due to external forces and the looming possibility of those conditions
worsening. As has already been noted, the internal cracks of OPEC are
growing ever more prominent with every passing month of this price
rout.9 7 The future purpose of OPEC is even less clear when one accounts
91. America Lifts Its Ban on Oil Exports, ECONOMIST (Dec. 18, 2015),
httpJ/www.economistcom/newsffinance-eonomics/21684531light-sweet-compromise-puts-end-
crude-market-distortions-america-lfts.
92. Skip York, U.S. Lifts the Ban on Crude Oil Exports: When Might It Matter for
Producers?, FORBES (Jan. 19, 2016, 01:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wood
mackenzie/2016/01/19/us-lifts-the-ban-on-crude-oil-exports-when-might-it-matter-for-
producers/#2e61e861328d ("As oil prices recover, we expect growth of US crude oil
production to return fast enough to eventually widen the Brent-LLS price differential
enough to make US crude oil exports viable. Based on our current oil market outlook, it
could take several years for the US crude oil export window to open.").
93. Id.
94. Id. ("Combined with Cheniere loading its first LNG export cargo from its Sabine
facility later this spring, the US is shifting from the world's largest petroleum importer to
a growing exporter. In less than five years, that concept has gone from the ridiculous to
reality.").
95. See Javier Blas, U.S. Plans to Sell Down Strategic Oil Reserve to Raise Cash,
BLOOMBERG, (Oct. 27, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-
27/u-s-plans-to-sell-down-strategic-oil-reserve-to-raise-cash.
96. See Lucian Pugliaresi, Does the U.S. Need a Large Strategic Petroleum Reserve?
YES: It Can Help Limit the Economic Harm in Case of a Crisis, WALL STREET J., (Nov. 15,
2015, 10:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/does-the-u-s-need-a-large-strategic-
petroleum-reserve-1447642801; Claire Groden, The U.S. Is Doing Something with Oil It
Has Only Done Once Before, FORTUNE, (Oct. 27, 2015, 12:47 PM), http://fortune.com/2015
/10/27/oil-spr-reserve-sale/.
97. See Cheong, supra note 81.
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for the shale formations beyond U.S. borders. As one scholar notes,
"Shale formations are hardly unique to the United States. They span
across every continent, offering their bounty to dozens of nations."98
While the U.S. was the first to develop the technology and
infrastructure to exploit its shale reserves, it will assuredly not be the
only country to utilize recent technological innovation to tap these
fields. In fact, the U.S. State Department formed the "Unconventional
Gas Technical Engagement Program (UGTEP), under the Bureau of
Energy Resources."9 9 This program was developed to "help countries
identify and develop their unconventional natural gas resources safely
and economically,"10 0 through the sharing of "technical expertise [and]
regulatory experience."1o1
With the development of UGTEP, the U.S. is effectively attacking
the future viability of OPEC through the dissemination of technology
and information. This could have rather significant repercussions when
one considers that "China (-31 Tcm), the U.K. (-1 Tcm), Eastern
Europe (-10 Tcm), Argentina (-23 Tcm), Australia (-12 Tcm), India (-3
Tcm), and Indonesia (-1 Tcm) all have substantial technically
recoverable shale reserves. By comparison, the United States has a
reported 19 Tcm of reserves." 102 While some of these countries face
significant hurdles in the development of these formations, 103 the
important takeaway from this Note is simply to acknowledge the latent
power that lies in the potential for development. Considering that the
U.S. development has already caused such a significant disruption, one
can hypothesize that the potential impact of other countries pursuing
this rapidly advancing technology.
While it is tempting to postulate about the future of these
organizations in this new energy landscape, it is ultimately an
unnecessary exercise in frivolity. What is important for the purpose of
this Note is to recognize that a number of both internal and external
factors are conspiring against the traditional purpose and future utility
of these organizations. One can simply posit at this time that there is
98. Gaille, supra note 7, at 95.
99. Tincher, supra note 48, at 120.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Gonclaves, supra note 42, at 256.
103. Hydraulic fracturing is a water intensive process, which requires significant
surrounding infrastructure to even begin to adequately develop Shale Reserves. Andrew
Steer, Shale Energy Potential Depends on Water Supply, WORLD RESOURCES INST. (Sept.
9, 2014), http://www.wri.org/blog/2014/09/shale-energy-potential-depends-water-supply
("Shale resource development can require large volumes of water: as much as to 25 million
liters, or 6.6 million gallons, for each well. And much of the fresh water used in hydraulic
fracturing cannot be recycled.").
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rapidly approaching a moment when members of these organizations
will be forced to reckon with the future and, for the first time ever, take
a seat at the same table to discuss the future of this commodity.
D. Cyclical Market Correction or Systemic Change in Oil Market Price
Much has been written regarding the cyclical nature of commodity
pricing and, more specifically, the oil markets.1 04 Driven by fluctuations
in global supply and demand, markets eventually respond with
corresponding peaks and troughs. During a period of weak demand, say
in the year immediately following the 2008 global financial crash, the
market will respond with lower prices until one of two things happens:
either supply is cut by producers or market demand eventually
recovers. 0 5 These two methods have been frequently employed as "[tihe
cyclical nature of the oil and gas industry has been evident over the past
30 years." 0 6 This cyclical response was clear in 2008 when prices
rapidly recovered due to global recovery and heavy stimulus beginning
in 2009 and 2010.
As has been discussed, however, this new oil era is unlike anything
so far experienced or studied. Scholarship regarding cyclical corrections
appears to be ill-equipped to explain the current operation of the
market. Momentum is building behind scholars who are arguing that
this is not a cyclical market correction but is instead a systemic change
in the factors that affect the price of oil. While the drastic slashing of
104. See generally Paul Stevens, Oil Markets, 21 OxFORD R. EcoN. POl'Y 19 (2005) ("[I]f
the cyclical school is believed then what goes up comes down . . . . The cyclical school
argues that all drivers of oil prices since December 2002 have been pushing in the same
direction. Thus, in the wet barrel market, demand has been exceptionally strong and, for
2004, is the highest global growth in oil demand since 1978."); Harry Bloch et al.,
Commodity Prices, Wages, and U.S. Inflation in the Twentieth Century, 26 J. POST
KEYNESIAN EcoN. 523 (2004) ("Our approach to modeling primary commodity prices,
wages, and inflation builds on ... the cyclical behavior of prices of primary commodities,
wages, and finished goods on world markets."); John H. Brown & Mark Partridge, The
Death of a Market: Standard Oil and the Demise of 19th Century Crude Oil Exchanges, 13
R. INDuS. ORG. 569 (1998) (using the monthly percent change in industrial production to
control for cyclical factors that influence the final demand for crude and refined oil to
explain why an efficient mechanism for price discovery was discarded in favor of internal
pricing by Standard Oil).
105. See Mark Kelman, Could Lawyers Stop Recessions? Speculations on Law and
Macroeconomics, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1215, 1263 (1993) ("While it may be counterintuitive,
stable monopolists may price more flexibly than almost-competitive sellers. Monopolists
need not worry about destabilizing tacit rent-extracting agreements and are certain to
absorb the entire force of any demand shock. Thus, they might quickly realign prices after
such a shock to maximize revenues.").
106. Carleton L. Ekberg & Douglas Gundry-White, Contracts with Land Services
Consultants, 52 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 25-1, § 25.01 (2006).
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capital expenditures by oil companies across the world in response to
the price rout should eventually-reduce the supply glut and enable a
price recovery,107 it appears more generally that we are witnessing the
new foundation being laid for a systemically different oil market.10 8
In fact, a recent report surfaced challenging long-held beliefs of
proven reserves held by various countries throughout the world. 109 The
Rystad Energy Report posits that the lack of uniformity in accounting
measures has resulted in greatly skewed data across oil producing
countries. 1 0 Some analysts have taken particular aim at the veracity of
the Saudi Kingdom's self-reporting of reserves.111 Additionally, a recent
announcement that Saudi Arabia intends to offer five percent of Saudi
Aramco-the state run energy company-to investors through an initial
public offering as part of a long-term economic blueprint, 112 has drawn
skepticism. 113 Regardless of the validity of any of these statements or
107. See Michelle Fox, Oil Production Won't Meet Demand in 5 Years: Former Shell Oil
CEO, YAHOO! FINANCE (May 19, 2016), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/oil-production-wont-
meet-demand-211405767.html.
108. See Anna Driver, Oil Companies Slash Spending, Jobs as Prices Slide for Second
Time, REUTERS (July 30, 2015, 02:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/30/us-
oil-results-idUSKCNOQ42GD2015073O#OsMoXAyhj9CemGYm.97.
109. See Nick Cunningham, U.S. Has World's Largest Oil Reserves, YAHOO! FINANCE
(July 5, 2016), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/u-world-largest-oil-reserves-214600980.html
("Rystad estimates that the U.S. holds 264 billion barrels of oil, more than half of which is
located in shale. That total exceeds the 256 billion barrels found in Russia, and the 212
billion barrels located in Saudi Arabia.").
110. See id.
111. John Kemp, Saudi Arabia's Oil Reserves: How Big are They Really?, UK REUTERS
(July 5, 2016, 04:30 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/saudi-oil-kemp-idUKL8N19R3LR
("Official reserves have remained constant every year since then at 260-265 billion
barrels, even as the country has consumed or exported another 94 billion barrels
('Statistical Review of World Energy', BP, 2016). If the government data is accurate, the
kingdom has managed the remarkable feat of exactly replacing each produced barrel with
new discoveries or increased estimates of the amount recoverable from existing fields.").
112. See Holly Elyatt, Saudi Arabia Likely to Ramp Oil Output This Year to Meet
'Growth' in Demand, YAHOO! FINANCE (May 10, 2016), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/saud
i-arabias-2t-oil-company-062057202.html.
113. See Rick Newman, The Saudis May Know Something About Oil the Rest of Us
Don't, (May 2, 2016), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/the-saudis-may-know-something-ab
out-oil-the-rest-of-us-don-t-182413782.html ("So it might be shrewder to consider a range
of scenarios that could explain the Saudis' willingness to sell a stake in Aramco.
Weatherley-White sees three: The Saudis might simply be making a modest effort to
diversify and become less dependent on oil, which would be smart. Or they could be sitting
on considerably less oil than the public thinks, and looking to sell while the rest of the
world thinks the emperor is still wearing clothes. Or, finally, the Saudis may be running
short of cash due to expensive wars with bordering states and the costly lifestyles of its
royals, and looking to bolster its reserves, without explictly [sic] saying so.").
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claims, the important takeaway is simply the supreme lack of certainty
that now exists regarding a number of previously "certain" beliefs.
It appears that technological innovation has finally managed to
systemically change how we think about and understand this unique
commodity.114 Just as numerous other industries have been forced to
confront the effects of technology on previous practices, it appears the
oil industry may finally be forced to acknowledge the systemic
repercussions of the Shale Revolution. Tim Mullaney brilliantly
analogized this new oil market to the oft cited effects of the technology
company Amazon, "[tihink of the Saudi welfare state as oil's brick-and-
mortar stores: integral to an old business model, unsustainable in the
new."1 15
III. THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: AN UNINTENDED SOLUTION?
Neither OPEC nor the IEA are capable of adapting to recent
market developments. Instead, I intend to make the case that the
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is the international organization best
suited to deal with the unprecedented territory of the oil market today.
Having previously considered the numerous market headwinds in
Section II of this Note, Part III will examine the ECT's origination,
content, and successes since its implementation.
A. ECT Lead-up and Development
As the first section of this Note discussed, both the WTO and
various GATT agreements suffer from the fact that the rules and
mandates contained within those agreements were promulgated
without any specific discussion of energy issues and did not include
"many of the most important energy exporters such as Indonesia,
Nigeria, Kuwait, Venezuela, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and,
most notably, Saudi Arabia."116 Because OPEC members were excluded
from preliminary discussions, any hope of these agreements influencing
114. Predominant scholarship on the oil industry has traditionally focused on mineral
rights, contracts for exploration, property rights, and sustainability. See, e.g., Sharon
Callaway Dittfurth, Common Problems in Conveying Oil and Gas Interests, 13 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 825 (1982); Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture - An Oil and
Gas Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899 (2005); Jay G. Martin & Ann L. MacNaughton,
Sustainable Development: Impacts of Current Trends on Oil and Gas Development, 24 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 257 (2004); David E. Pierce, The Renaissance of Law in the
Law of Oil and Gas: The Contract Dimension, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 909 (2004).
115. See Mullaney, supra note 57.
116. Leal-Arcas et. al., supra note 38, at 39.
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and regulating the oil markets was moot from the start. In fact, only one
section from the original GATT agreement can even be tenuously
applied to oil,117 and when applied, a report from 2004 authored by U.S.
Senator Frank Lautenberg found that OPEC members were in violation
through the use of "OPEC-mandated oil production quotas."1 18
The Lautenberg Report, however, failed to acknowledge the loophole
that exists between the two different physical states of oil. As scholar
Stephen Broome points out, "it is important to recognize the distinction
between oil in commerce (i.e., oil extracted and stored in a manner
suitable for transportation to the market) and oil in its natural state
(i.e., oil still in the ground)."11 9 Although this may seem to be a rather
technical distinction, "oil in its natural state has not gone through a
production process, is not part of inventory, and so is not properly
characterized as a "product" within the meaning of Article XI."1 20
Through the exploitation of this imprecise drafting, "it follows that only
after an OPEC member has produced oil for consumption could it violate
Article Xj."121
This impasse persisted for decades without a satisfactory answer.
OPEC members were beyond the reach of existing regulation and had
zero incentive to comply with importers. Then, with the end of the Cold
War and dissolution of the Soviet Union as an impetus, Dutch Prime
Minister Ruud Lubbers proposed the formation of a European Energy
Community in June 1990.122 This suggestion was made out of strategic
necessity. Western Europe is without appreciable oil reserves while
Eastern Europe and other countries that comprised the Soviet Union
contain substantial reserves within their borders. 123
What began as a simple politically strategic suggestion quickly
developed into the 1991 Energy Charter, a document that, at first
glance, appeared to have no more force than the NGOs that preceded it.
117. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] ("No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties,
taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences
or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party. . . .").
118. The Lautenberg Report was authored by U.S. Senator Frank R. Lautenberg,
Democrat of New Jersey, in 2004. See Stephen A. Broome, Conflicting Obligations for Oil
Exporting Nations?: Satisfying Membership Requirements of Both OPEC and the WTO, 38
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 409, 409 (2006).
119. Id. at 416.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 416-17.
122. See The Energy Charter Process, INT'L ENERGY CHARTER, httpi/www.energycharter.
org/process/overview/ (last updated Aug. 5, 2015).
123. See The World Factbook, Country Comparison, Crude Oil-Proved Reserves, CENT.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.govflibrary/pubhcations/the-world-factbook/rank
order/2244rank.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
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The charter was "a concise expression of the principles that should
underpin international energy cooperation, based on a shared interest
in secure energy supply and sustainable economic development."1 24
While idealistically sound, this charter served no more practical purpose
than the IEA, other than being supported by a far broader base of
members.125
Ultimately, the most important legacy of the 1991 Energy Charter is
as a stepping stone to the Energy Charter Treaty signed in December
1994 and entered into legal force on April 16, 1998.126 With the
preliminary proclamations of the 1991 Energy Charter well received,
those same signatories endeavored to address the gap in relations
between importers and exporters. Negotiations acknowledged that "in a
world of increasing interdependence between net exporters of energy
and net importers, it is widely recognised that multilateral rules can
provide a more balanced and efficient framework for international
cooperation than is offered by bilateral agreements alone or by non-
legislative instruments." 27
B. Energy Charter Treaty Provisions and Claimed Purpose
In drafting this Treaty, it is clear that negotiators were cognizant of
the stalemate that dominated the market for the previous two decades.
Too strong a stance against coordinated production would jeopardize the
possibility of OPEC members even taking a seat at the table; while
idealistic glosses and imprecise proclamations would immediately
negate any practical power. What was eventually drafted and agreed
upon by the fifty-four original members struck a balance that
represented
a political commitment to cooperation in the energy
sector based on some key principles: the establishment
of market conditions that will stimulate private
investments; the respect for state sovereignty over
natural resources; the application of the principle of non-
124. The European Energy Charter, INT'L ENERGY CHARTER, http://www.energycharter.
org/process/european-energy-charter-1991/ (last updated June 2, 2015).
125. Membership included not only net-importers but was significantly strengthened by
the presence of Eurasian countries with proven reserves such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Yemen. See id.
126. ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY AND RELATED
DOCUMENTS: A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNATIONAL ENERGY COOPERATION (2004)
[hereinafter ECT]. For a brief overview of the Energy Charter Treaty, see Leal-Arcas et.
al., supra note 38, at 58.
127. The Energy Charter Process, supra note 122.
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discrimination among participants; and the recognition
of the importance of environmental sustainability.128
The membership of the ECT and its provision for observer status
quite possibly represents one of its greatest successes. While the
majority of signatories to the Charter are composed of countries from
Europe, the ECT "also provides for observer status, and twenty-four
states participate on that basis including the United States, China,
Saudi Arabia, Iran, Venezuela, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, many
other Persian Gulf states, and international organizations like the
World Bank and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations." 129 For the
first time ever, an organization focused specifically on oil had exporters
and importers sitting at the same table. Furthermore, as Article 2 of the
treaty states, the ECT was concerned with more than just the
rudimentary defensive issues identified by the IEA and instead sought
to "establish a legal framework in order to promote long term
cooperation in the energy field."130
As scholar Theocharis Grigoriadis parses out, the E CT's uniqueness
is underscored by its twofold nature as "a multilateral investment
agreement in its premises and a global administrative law mechanism
in its redistributive effects."' 3 ' The regulation of investment, as alluded
to by Grigoriadis, is extensively examined in the following section, as
this feature is by far the single greatest success of the ECT to date. At
this moment, a brief review of pertinent ECT provisions will underscore
the utility of the document as a whole.
Article 1, Definitions, seeks to address the technical gap-discussed
earlier regarding Article XI of the 1948 GATT-between oil in the
ground and oil which has entered the stream of commerce. The ECT,
through Article 26, provides protection for qualified investments
associated with "Economic Activity in the Energy Sector."1 32 Article 1
"broadly defines Economic Activity in the Energy Sector as economic
activity concerning the 'exploration, extraction, refining, production,
storage, land transport, transmission, distribution, trade, marketing or
sale' of energy materials and products."1 33 This comprehensive definition
ensures that members to a contract cannot circumvent ECT mandates
128. Leal-Arcas et. al., supra note 38, at 58.
129. Sussman, supra note 41, at 954.
130. ECT, supra note 126, art. 2.
131. Theocharis N. Grigoriadis, State Responsibility and Antitrust in the Energy Charter
Treaty: Socialization us. Liberalization in Bilateral Investment Relations, 44 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 45, 47 (2008).
132. ECT, supra note 126, art. 1, 26.
133. Matthew T. Parish & Charles B. Rosenberg, An Introduction to the Energy Charter
Treaty, 20 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 191, 194 (2009).
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through exploitation of the same loophole identified in the 1948 GATT,
as this definition encompasses all steps of oil production.
Additionally, Article 26, Settlement of Disputes between an Investor
and a Contracting Party, and Article 27, Settlement of Disputes
between Contracting Parties, provide for "unconditional consent to the
submission of a dispute to international arbitration." 134 Article 26
further provides that "awards of arbitration, which may include an
award of interest, shall be final and binding upon the parties to the
dispute." 3 5
While Article 26 provides for a final backstop of international
arbitration, it does not completely subsume the parties' abilities to
contract freely as investors are given three broad options to resolve
disputes, including: "(1) the courts or administrative tribunals of the
respondent state; (2) a previously agreed dispute settlement procedure,
which is usually defined in a contract or concession agreement; or (3)
international arbitration."1 36 In this capacity, Article 26 acts as safety
assurance for investors if either party does not honor the contract
provisions.
Proceeding to Grigoriadis's second point of characterizing the ECT
as a "global administrative law mechanism,"1 3 7 a transition to
examining the Treaty's administratively focused provisions will
exemplify why the ECT is best suited for governing today's
unprecedented developments within the industry.
Beginning with Article 6, arguably the most inflammatory section
from OPEC members' perspective, the provision provides
pronouncements regarding competition. While the article begins with a
call for contracting parties to "work to alleviate market distortions and
barriers to competition,"138 it does later acknowledge "contracting
parties may co-operate in the enforcement of their competition rules by
consulting and exchanging information."1 39 The basic thrust of this
provision clearly takes aim at the OPEC monopoly but does
acknowledge the necessity of market coordination. 140 This Article does
134. ECT, supra note 126, art. 26.
135. Id.
136. Parish & Rosenberg, supra note 133, at 196.
137. Grigoriadis, supra note 131, at 47.
138. ECT, supra note 126, art. 6.
139. Id.
140. This provision is of the utmost relevance today as it appears that OPEC's market
share is facing exterior forces beyond its control. See DiChristopher & Schoen, supra note
86.
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not make the practices of OPEC outright illegal, but instead simply
provides for an avenue of discussion between contracting parties. 141
Article 18 represents a novel and important statement regarding a
country's sovereignty over energy resources. This measure is attractive
from an individual country's perspective as it seeks to prevent
multinational corporations from gaining excessive power-an
unfortunate reality of the past. Specifically, the Article provides that
"contracting parties recognize state sovereignty and sovereign rights
over energy resources. They reaffirm that these must be exercised in
accordance with and subject to the rules of international law." 142 This
Article, proceeding into the future, provides important protection and an
incentive for countries to join the ECT, most notably, countries that
have yet to discover or adequately develop oil reserves.
C. Energy Charter Treaty Successes
By far the single greatest accomplishment of the ECT was a direct
result of dispute resolution provisions previously discussed. 143 These
provisions "provide the 'teeth' that can serve to assure investors that
their investments will be protected with respect to the measures
specified in the ECT."144 The most studied and lauded example on this
topic is the Yukos Dispute.
The Yukos Oil Company became a publicly-traded joint stock
corporation in 1995 after President Boris Yeltsin led a massive
privatization effort in an attempt to liberalize the Russian economy in
the hopes of moving the country toward a free-market economy.1 45
Purchased by Mikhail Khodorkovsky and a group of investors, Yukos
quickly became the top oil producer in Russia and helped Khodorkovsky
become Russia's richest man by 2003.146 In 2003, Yukos averaged a
141. See Grigoriadis, supra note 131, at 52 ("Policy discourse on energy antitrust is
defined both in terms of state sovereignty (vertical constraint) and domestic energy
business competition (horizontal constraint).").
142. ECT, supra note 126, art. 18.
143. Additionally, provisions regarding rights against expropriation, when coupled with
the ECT arbitration provisions, provide powerful assurances to investors that their rights
will be protected. See Parish & Rosenberg, supra note 133, at 201 ("The ECT's rights are
extensive, but in no sense unique. It accords investors the right not to have their
investments expropriated; the right to so-called 'fair and equitable treatment'; and
'constant protection and security.' It also contains what are known as 'national treatment'
and 'most favored nation' obligations. There is also a right of choice of 'key personnel."').
144. Sussman, supra note 41, at 956.
145. See Peter C. Laidlaw, Provisional Application of the Energy Charter as Seen in the
Yukos Dispute, 52 Santa Clara L. Rev. 655, 666 (2012).
146. See id. at 667.
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daily output of more than 1.6 million barrels of oil and held over $18
billion in assets.1 4 7
The Russian Federation's second President, Vladimir Putin, quickly
identified Yukos and Khordkovsky's power and influence as a
problem. 148 Putin immediately espoused a concern over the growing
power of a small contingent of independent businessmen, including
Khodorkovsky and his cohorts, and began a process of "returning major
energy sector companies to state control by harassing those involved
with Yukos."149 This was achieved through arresting high level company
executives on various charges, including fraud and tax evasion.150 The
Russian Ministry of Finance "made a series of tax assessments that
would eventually total $27.5 billion, based on purportedly deficient tax
payments from 2000 to 2004."151 Finally, the Ministry of Justice
announced an auction of Yuganskneftegaz (YNG), a Yukos subsidiary
responsible for the bulk of oil production, to settle the reported
deficiencies.1 52 Ultimately, a company called Baikalfinansgroup,
"thought to be a front company and only recently registered in a grocery
shop in a small Russian town, paid $9.4 billion for an asset that was
valued at $60 billion by the London Stock Exchange, and between $14.7
billion and $21.1 billion by private financiers." 53
After unsuccessfully exhausting other legal resources,
Khodorkovsky, via a subsidiary, sent notice to Russia regarding the
constructive expropriation of Yukos and sought arbitration under ECT
mandate. 154 Arbitration proceeded in accordance with ECT provisions
and, despite Russia's best efforts to retroactively back out of the ECT
after being an original signatory in 1994, the arbitration panel held that
the ECT provisionally applied to Russia. 55
For the purpose of this Note, the Yukos decision is discussed
because of the significant international attention it received and for the
147. Id.
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 667-68.
151. Id. at 668.
152. See id.
153. Id. at 669; see After Yukos, THE ECONOMIST (May 10, 2007, 12:16 PM),
http://www.economist.com/node/9167397.
154. See Laidlaw, supra note 145, at 670.
155. See Yukos Universal Ltd. v. Russian Fed'n, 227 PCA Case Repository T 134 (2009);
Hulley Enters. Ltd. (Cyprus) v. Russian Fed'n, 226 PCA Case Repository T 301 (2009) ("In
the Tribunal's opinion, by signing the ECT, the Russian Federation agreed that the Treaty
as a whole would be applied provisionally pending its entry into force unless the principle
of provisional application itself were inconsistent 'with its constitution, laws or
regulations."').
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ultimate success of ECT investor protections. 56 By upholding the
various investor protections contained within the ECT, the
international community-both investors and countries alike-took note
of the ECT's effectiveness. 157
IV. WADING INTO UNCHARTED WATERS
In this new environment, there may finally be an incentive for
cooperation among importers and exporters. While lower prices at the
pump are indisputably favorable to consumers, macroeconomic forces
may trump consumers short-term increased spending power. High debt
loads among domestic oil producers and a resulting flurry of defaults
could potentially have devastating effects on the U.S. and global
economies.158
Additionally, OPEC members could risk an Arab Spring-like future
if social spending is continually cut in order to cope with a lower-price
environment.15 9 Because neither of the aforementioned options is
palatable to either group, it is becoming increasingly more likely that
we will begin to witness an unprecedented era of collaboration among
producers and consumers as a new equilibrium is established. Having
discussed, at length, what makes the developments of the last decade
unprecedented, it is now time to make the case for why the ECT is best
suited to encourage cooperation as we enter a new and unknown world
156. Alex M. Niebruegge, Provisional Application of the Energy Charter Treaty: The
Yukos Arbitration and the Future Place of Provisional Application in International Law, 8
CHI. J. INT'L L. 355, 372 (2007) ("Thus, the outcome of the Yukos Arbitration has the
potential to directly impact not only future arbitration under the ECT but, more broadly,
the status, characterization, and obligations imposed by provisional application in
international law.").
157. Assuredly an award of $50 billion, finally announced in July 18, 2014, also merited
a substantial amount of attention as the largest award ever rendered by an Arbitral
Tribunal. See Yukos: Largest Arbitral Award Ever, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP,
http://www.shearman.com/en/services/practices/international-arbitrationlyukos-arbitral-
award (last visited Nov. 20, 2016).
158. Justine Underhill, Why Oil and Gas Companies are Barely Scraping By, YAHOO!
FINANCE (May 17, 2016) http://finance.yahoo.com/news/oil-debt-interest-payments-
122155505.html ("The U.S. energy sector (XLE) is facing $370 billion of debt, a number
that has more than doubled in the past decade. .. . While $5.1 billion of U.S. energy debt
matures this year, $25.1 billion will mature in 2017. The number risies [sic] to $52.5
billion in 2020.").
159. Angus McDowall & Celine Aswad, Expats, Employers Worried Over Uncertain
Saudi Tax Proposal, REUTERS (June 8, 2016 2:47 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-
saudi-plan-expats-idUKKCNOYUlOO ("The collapse in oil prices after mid-2014 has
pushed Saudi Arabia to contemplate a radical overhaul of all parts of its economy,
including new taxes, privatisations, a changed investment strategy and sharp cuts in
government spending.").
304
THE DEATH OF OPEC
of twenty-first century oil. The ECT is in an advantageous position
because of its noted bilateral success, broad base of membership, and
pre-existing inclusion of provisions addressing relevant areas of
concern.
First, the ECT has already achieved a number of commendable
victories in line with the stated purpose of the organization. The
resolution of the Yukos dispute provided firm support that the ECT was
not just another powerless NGO. 160 Additionally, because the charter
was written with the sole purpose of governing a single industry, it is
not weakened by general or ambiguous charter provisions.16 1
Furthermore, the ECT was not written in a one-sided manner; rather,
the charter provides support for outside individual investors, importers,
and exporters. This protection, especially for the developing nations
with often little more than the oil reserves they seek to develop, is quite
important. Additionally, other Articles discuss binding provisions that
address key personnel,1 62 compensation for losses,163 and capital
transfers. 164
Second, and perhaps most importantly, the ECT's preexisting broad
base of membership makes it the perfect venue to be repurposed to force
the cooperation necessary to proceed into this new oil era. The one-sided
focus of both OPEC and the IEA has taken its toll. Neither organization
is equipped to handle bilateral negotiations. Instead, both were formed
primarily as defensive measures. 65 In stark contrast, the ECT was
formed with functional considerations that are represented in the
bilateral membership of both importers and exporters. 6 6 While
countries like the U.S. and the majority of OPEC members only hold
observer status, it is important to recognize that having these countries
in the same room is an important first step. Simply put, observer status
is better than no status.
160. Matteo M. Winkler, Arbitration Without Privity and Russian Oil: The Yukos Case
Before the Houston Court, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 115, 147 (2006) ('Thanks to the ECT,
Yukos is entitled to enjoy an unquestionable right to initiate arbitration that can be
activated by the investor through a simple expression of consent to arbitrate the
dispute.").
161. Saamir Elshihabi, The Difficulty Behind Securing Sector-Specific Investment
Establishment Rights: The Case of the Energy Charter Treaty, 35 INT'L LAW. 137, 145
(2001) ("The ECT avoids the use of general language, and instead specifies the particular
rights or prohibitions within the area described.").
162. ECT, supra note 126, art. 11.
163. Id. art. 12.
164. Id. art. 14.
165. See About, supra note 31; Hickel, supra note 24, at 107.
166. See Constituency of the Energy Charter Conference: Members of the Energy Charter
Conference, INT'L ENERGY CHARTER, http://www.energycharter.org/who-we-are/members-
observers/ (last updated Mar. 19, 2015).
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Furthermore, as earlier noted, the long-term viability of both OPEC
and the IEA is increasingly being questioned within this new landscape.
By definitional design, the IEA's most prominent member, the United
States, may be technically excluded from membership.16 7 Additionally,
the cornerstone of IEA policy-strategic petroleum reserves-has
recently been acknowledged to be an outdated policy. 16 8 Moreover,
considering both the rapid technological advancements within the last
two years and the existence of massive shale reserves outside of the
United States, OPEC's functional purpose may be a relic of the past.
The waning functionality of both of these groups has opened a void that
the ECT must fill.
Finally, the ECT already contains a number of provisions that
address, at least superficially, the present-day issues mentioned
throughout this Note. While it is doubtful that the original negotiations
and signatories could have predicted the technological developments
that have altered the landscape today, many of the articles nonetheless
seek to address these problems. Of particular importance are
"substantive clauses in the ECT that include protections against trade-
related investment measures, 69 unfair competition, 170 and restrictions
on the transit of energy materials and products."171 More generally, the
Charter's overall advocacy of global cooperation is an integral reason
why the ECT is best suited to subsume the roles formerly served by
unilaterally- and defensively-focused organizations. 172
CONCLUSION
The future of the oil industry is amidst a drastic transition and the
past is of little support for the future. The ebb and flow of the market is
167. See Member Countries, supra note 33 (listing the United States as one of twenty-
nine member countries).
168. See Groden, supra note 96; Bill Tucker, Has the Time Come to Say Bye-bye to the
SPR? (Dec. 9, 2014, 2:48 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/billtucker/2014/12/09/has-the-
time-come-to-say-bye-bye-to-the-spr#618696721f75.
169. ECT, supra note 126, art. 5; Elshihabi, supra note 161, at 145, n. 51 ("[Alrticle 5
provides foreign investors protection against government measures or domestic laws that
force the investor to purchase a certain quantity of domestic goods, or restrain the
investor's ability to import goods necessary for local production and use or export.").
170. ECT, supra note 126, art. 6; Elshihabi, supra note 161, at 145.
171. ECT, supra note 126, art. 7; Elshihabi, supra note 161, at 145.
172. See Sussman, supra note 41, at 954 ("The ECT was designed to meet the need for
multilateral rules for international cooperation on investment protection, which is
required by the increasing globalization of the world's economy, the interdependence of
the energy sector, and the long-term and highly capital-intensive nature of energy
projects.").
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no longer tied to fundamentals,173 but is instead subject to news articles
selling either boom or bust-sometimes on the same day.1 74 While many
false bottoms have been called throughout this prolonged price rout,1 75
experts have been continually confounded by the current operation of
the market.
While many may-and have-been tempted to make bold
proclamations about the future of this industry, it should be abundantly
clear at this point that those statements are little more than wishful
thinking and conjecture. Unlike the past, the future trajectory of the oil
market is no longer in the hands of a few. A cartel is only effective when
there is a finite amount of a resource and the sheer majority is held
within that cartel. Between Russia, U.S. shale production, and other
sources yet to be tapped around the world, OPEC has simply lost control
of the tight grip that once crippled the U.S. in 1973.
It may not be immediate-and certainly has not been so far-but I
believe that the systemic changes that have already occurred and
appear prime to continue developing will eventually force OPEC to
recognize the archaic nature of its current regime. The sheer resilience
of the U.S. Shale Gas industry has effectively rendered OPEC's tactics
meaningless. Despite the cartel's best efforts, technology has profoundly
disrupted this industry.
From the U.S. domestic perspective, the uncertainty and massive
fluctuations in prices is nearly as untenable. While the U.S. is
positioned slightly better than OPEC members, due to shale energy
companies existing within the private sector, the possibilities of
173. Patti Domm, OPEC Comments Show Lost Relevance Ahead of Meeting, CNBC (Nov.
23, 2015 3:57 PM) http://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/23/opec-comments-show-lost-relevance-
ahead-of-meeting.html ("Oil surged Monday on remarks from Saudi officials that the
country is willing to work with oil producing and exporting countries, both inside and
outside of OPEC to maintain market and price stability.").
174. Compare Christopher Johnson, Update 3: Oil Steadies as Saudi Sees OPEC
"Common Position," CNBC (Sep. 1, 2016 4:43 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/01/
reuters-america-update-3-oil-steadies-as-saudi-sees-opec-common-position.html (claiming
oil prices steadied) with Timothy Puko & Kevin Baxter, Oil Prices Slide as Oversupply
Comes Back Into Focus, WALL STREET J. (Sep. 1, 2016, 4:43 PM), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/oil-prices-stumble-on-weak-fundamentals-stronger-dollar-1472727728 (claiming
oil prices dropped).
175. See Catherine Ngai, Fooled by Oil's False Bottom, Most US Shale Firms Skipped
Hedging in Fourth-quarter, REUTERS (Mar. 16, 2016 1:06 AM), http://www.reuters.com
/article/us-usa-oil-hedging-idUSKCNOWIOFB; Tom DiChristopher, Crude Oil Rally Based
on 'False Hope': Analyst, CNBC (Feb. 12, 2016 12:07 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/12
/crude-oil-rally-based-on-false-hope-analysts.html.
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contagion within the larger global economy are just as serious.176 As
previously discussed, overzealous lending to shale oil companies during
the boom has created a serious looming debt bubble.177
Rather than venturing to make the same frivolous statements and
proclamations as so many others, this Note concludes by weighing the
only tangible certainties available. First, the current price
environment-subject to erratic peaks and troughs-is unsustainable.
Second, members of OPEC are on the brink of collapse while any
faltering in the U.S. economy could have dire effects upon an already
stagnate and uncertain global economy. Third, there currently does not
exist-nor has ever existed-a mechanism to regulate the most
important global commodity. Finally, without such a mechanism in
place, the new status quo will be that of uncertainty-an uncertainty
that benefits no one.
I believe we are on the brink of a historic moment when, for the first
time ever, importers and exporters are effectively forced to take a seat
at the same table to combat the numerous uncertainties dominating the
market today.178 Cooperation is the only sensible solution to such
widespread and systemic change; and of the preexisting treaties and
organizations, the ECT stands alone as an attempt to bridge the gap
between producers and consumers. While one could certainly make the
case for an entirely new treaty or organization, the need for immediate
action at this point should be clear. Any further bureaucratic delay
could be catastrophic for OPEC members, U.S. producers, and the entire
global economy. The ECT stands ready to broker cooperation among
longtime competitors and guide this uncertain market into a new era of
clarity.
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